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Abstract 
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between stock price synchronicity and voluntary 
disclosure in perspective of Pakistan. The degree of co-movement of stock price depends on the 
relative amount of firm-level and the wide market information. The aim of this study is to 
investigate the relationship between the degrees of firm’s information which is measured by 
voluntary disclosure levels and how much this firm-specific information is incorporated in the stock 
price, measured by synchronicity. We use 5-year data from Pakistan Stock Exchange for the period 
of 2010 to 2014 for KSE 100 index. We use SD-SCORE to measure the level of voluntary 
disclosure. SD-SCORE is calculated based on the information provided in firm’s annual reports. We 
assign points to each company based on five broad criteria. Additional points were given if firm 
provides quantitative data of some specific item used in the calculation of SD-SCORE. Further, R2 is 
used as a proxy of synchronicity which shows the level of information impounded into share prices. 
We regress synchronicity on voluntary disclosure level to find out whether it incorporates in share 
price or not. We conclude that in Pakistan, voluntary disclosure has a significant positive relation 
with stock price synchronicity. Our results suggest that not only public but also the private 
information incorporate in the stock price and provide inversely U-shape relationship between 
synchronicity and voluntary disclosure. The results of this study are based on multi-variant analysis, 
there is a significant positive relation between stock price synchronicity and firm’s voluntary 
disclosure levels. 
Keywords: Agency Theory; Asymmetric Information; Pakistan Stock Exchange; 
Synchronicity; Voluntary Disclosure 
 
Introduction 
Synchronicity in the perspective of the finance and accounting is used in the capital market 
and called stock price synchronicity. Stock price synchronicity can be described as the individual 
stock price upward or downward movement with relative to some conditions.  (Roll, 1988) explains 
that degree of co-movement of stock price depends on the relative amount of firm-level and the 
wide market information. It can be explained that stock return synchronicity is the variation of 
common returns for each firm to their total return variation of the whole capital market. While 
(Chung et al., 2011) says that the situation of stock synchronicity when the price of all single firms 
is highly correlated to the movement of the stock price  
(Roll, 1988) finds that stock price synchronicity is explained by the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model. (Morck et al., 2000) says synchronicity as a dependent variable, can be used as the measure 
of the degree of firm-specific information into share price and is computed by R-square.  This R-
square can be estimated by CAPM. He argued that by using CAPM, stock price co-movement might 
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be downward when disclosure specific information of firm is better which should be reflected by the 
low value of R square. (Perold, 2004) finds that the firm’s return is affected by both factors which 
are non-diversifiable and the firm’s specific characteristics. Asset price model provides the 
fundamental and uses as the benchmark to understand the agency of cause between asset price and 
the behavior of investment according to the degree of market, industry and the firm-specific 
information. 
(Meek et al. 1995) find voluntary disclosures are that information which is beyond the 
requirement of GAAP and SECP rules, according to rules the information which is provided in 
firm’s annual report must be relevant to the user for decision making. (Hossain et al., 2014) find 
mostly firms disclose the reason(s) for an auditor can change in limited conditions, it means there is 
flexibility to disclose the information and auditor use the methods which have fulfilled the mandate 
of SECP. (Alford et al., 1993, Ball et al., 2000) find information disclosure is some time depends on 
firm’s policies. Different firms are carried out voluntary but it can vary from firm to firm or 
industry, company size and geographic region.(Diamond & Verrechia, 1991) find a high level of 
disclosure can increase the liquidity of firm’s stock. He argues voluntary disclosure is affected by 
the structure of corporate governance and the structure of the ownership. Voluntary disclosure has 
the significant influenced by the firm’s top executives and that have their own style to disclose of 
firm-specific information which is based on their personal backgrounds like their career and 
experiences. 
(Fama & Laffers, 1971) proposed information hypothesis which says that the firm’s specific 
information is compulsory in the annual reports of the firm, that specific information is important 
for the investor to minimize their risk on investment, taking right decisions on their investment and 
earn more profits. It is compulsory that this useful information includes all type of information 
which can be firm-level, market level and industry level. In the benefits of the voluntary disclosure, 
we take it from the different perspective. On the investor side, it provides the full information to the 
investor and reduces the asymmetric information between aware and unaware investors; otherwise, 
it will take the market to inefficient and not reflect the exact prices (Bushman & Smith, 2001). On 
the firm side, voluntary disclosure reduces the uncertainty regarding firm’s goals and targets, and it 
gives the right option to choose the best, managers to take good decisions according to the situation 
and communication smoothly between the managers and other related interested parties like 
stakeholder who are directly connected to the firm. (Glosten et al. 1985, Diamond et al. 1991) find 
that a higher level of disclosure increases the liquidity of the market and lowers the cost of capital. 
Stock price synchronicity reflects the resource allocation in the capital market. The aim of 
this study is to investigate the relationship of voluntary disclosure and how this information is 
impounded into stock prices. Pakistan Stock Exchange (Formerly KSE) is an emerging market and 
this study has implications for both regulators and investors. This study proposes the how an 
investor can formulate trading strategies based on information disclosure. Further, the motive of the 
voluntary disclosure of firm is when they need or plan to issue equity or public debt or want to 
acquire another company; the firms disclose their firm-specific information to investor and effect 
their perception (Healy et al., 2001). (Aboody & Kaznik, 2000) propose another motive of manager 
to voluntary disclosure is to take favorable effect of their stock returns about their stock related 
compensation. Mostly analyst uses the voluntary disclosure of the firm-specific information to use 
the forecast. Managers disclose good or bad information to fulfill their stock returns requirements. 
(Barry& Brown, 1985) explain voluntary disclosure plays a significant role to solve that problem 
because information is spread equally on every side and it helps to reduce the capital cost. (Skinner, 
1994) finds voluntary disclosure is also used to save the litigation cost; it is the responsibility of the 
manager to reduce the cost of litigation to pre-disclose the bad news. 
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Literature Review 
Stock price synchronicity is the measurement which is used in share price movement, and it 
can also reflect the level of firm-specific information within the industry and market levels (Roll, 
1988). In very simple words stock return synchronicity is common return variation for each firm to 
the variation of the whole capital market (Roll, 1988). He explains the stock price synchronicity by 
Capital Asset Pricing model (CAPM). CAPM was first discussed by (William Sharp, 1964) in 
research papers. In 1976 Black extended the model and argue that firms return affected by both 
factors which are firm-specific characteristics and non-diversifiable factors. This extended model 
makes a fundamental contribution to explaining the asset price. In synchronicity, when the co-
movement is high, there are also some other variables affected which are not used in our paper, like 
it increases the liquidity and same as the high volatility of the stocks also increase the liquidity of 
the stock (Chan, Hameed, & Kang, 2013). He explains two hypotheses, under the hypothesis of 
relative synchronicity, there is a positive relation between the stock return co-movement and the 
liquidity.  
Voluntary disclosure is that information when the firm can disclose with any cost through 
annual reports. The main reason to disclosure the information is to reduce the asymmetric 
information because due to asymmetric information, agency problem will rise. It happens in that 
situation where the owner and controller of the company are in a different firm. Principal pays to the 
agent for their services to take the decisions on its behalf of them (Jeasen & Meckiling, 1976). 
Sometimes the reason for this conflict of interest is to invest money in other projects while the 
principal does want so (Smith & Skinner, 1999). The other main reason for this problem to hide the 
information from the principal. It is always supposed that managers or agents have more information 
as compare to the investor (Healy & Palepu, 2001). Managers sometimes hide the adverse 
information from the stakeholder, or in other situation when information give benefits they disclose 
more information (Milgrom, 1981). Voluntary disclosure plays an important role to reduce 
asymmetric information. There are some forces which affect the manager’s decisions to take the 
voluntary disclosure; one of them is to reduce the capital cost (Barry & Brown, 1985). 
(Roll, 1988) makes the thing clearer the degree to which stock moves together. He argues 
that stock price synchronicity depends on the comparative amount of market-wide or firm–specific 
information contributes to the stock prices. (Morck, 2000) argues that the economies of higher per 
capita GDP move comparatively unsynchronized manner, vice-versa the economies of lower per 
capita GDP stock price move up and down together. That’s why we can define synchronicity as the 
co-movement in particular time of stocks of share market.( Shiller, 1981, west 1988) find that the 
stock price level is too high to explain by the volatility in the implicit fundamentals like dividends. 
(West, 1988) provide the theoretical framework where the increase in the firm-specific return 
volatility is related with less firm-specific information and more noise in return. The previous 
studies represented stock price synchronicity can be defined by R-squared from assets pricing 
regressions which can be used to measure the relevant firm-specific information reflected in returns. 
(Morck et al., 2000) find that the stock price in poor countries which have less market equity, weak 
protection of investors rights, weak legal framework and so many factors which move together to 
make a weak market, has high synchronicity. 
(Kalok C et al., 2013) provides the evidence of higher return co-movement means the higher 
systematic volatility relative to the total volatility which improves the synchronicity.   S&P 500 
index shows the high synchronicity of that stock which improves the liquidity and there is a positive 
relation between the stock return synchronicity and the liquidity. They provide the empirical support 
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that the higher stocks return synchronicities represent the higher information environment and it 
provides the asymmetric information between the outside investor and firms insider. (Iftekhar H. et 
al., 2014) find in the case of China that the better development of the legal and political institution 
are the result of the great firm-specific information. When stock price shows the more firm-specific 
information, there will be the less stock price synchronicity. Improved property rights and better law 
enforcement and high political pluralism are all associated to the stock price informativeness. The 
corporation must disclose their information through the financial reports, management discussion 
and analysis and other regulatory mediums. (Ferdinand A. Gul et al., 2010) suggest that different 
factors like concentrated ownership, audit quality of firm’s disclosure, government ownership or 
foreign ownership also affect the share price of the firm’s stock They also find the synchronicity is 
higher when the mostly shareholder is the government. And synchronicity inversely effects on the 
foreign ownership and auditor quality.  
 
Methodology 
The latest research finds the relation between stock price synchronicity and the voluntary 
disclosure of firm-specific information. According to previous literature, stock price synchronicity 
can be measured by an R-squared method which impounds the firm-specific information into stock 
price. R-squared is estimated from CAPM which is derived from many previous research studies 
(Roll, 1988; Morck et al, 2000) 
The main interesting question is that: Whether the firm’s voluntary disclosures is related 
with price synchronicity? 
Voluntary disclosure model uses the self-constructed variable SD-SCORE which is 
constructed by (Jiang and Habib, 2009), this variable measure only the quantity of data but not the 
quality of firm-specific information. Our result shows the significant and positive relation between 
the stock price synchronicity and firm’s voluntary disclosure, It means that in firms stock reflects 
both information, not only the firm-specific but private information also (Xing & Anderson, 2011). 
We suggest that our results are monotonic mean it has either positive or negative relation between 
R-squared or quality of disclosure. (Kelly, 2005 & Dasgupta et al., 2010) also shows that the 
significantly positive relationship between voluntary disclosure and synchronicity, so it suggests 
tacitly that R-squared can use as a direct proxy for quality of information. While in contrast (Morck, 
2000, Jin and Myers, 2006) find in their studies that there is a significantly negative relationship 
between voluntary disclosure and stock price synchronicity. (Haggard et al., 2008) also suggest that 
R-squared can use as an inverse proxy for quality of information. Both studies which support our 
results and not suggest the same R-squared proxy of quality of information but both are not agreed 
and have a different set of mind to use this proxy.   Some other studies suggest that there is no- 
monotonic relation means neither significantly positive or nor negative relationship between stock 
price synchronicity and voluntary disclosure. Ashbaugh et al., 2006) proposed in his study that R-
squared can’t use as the universal proxy for the quality of disclosure.  
We use the Karachi Stock Exchange 100 index. Overall Pakistan stock market is small but 
with high trading activities. In many aspects, this stock market appears to be working as a typical 
emerging market with high volatility, high returns, high market concentration and catch the 
investments, Pakistan’s markets is segmented from the major markets provide a potential venue for 
diversification. (J. Iqbal, 2008). We take data from the KSE 100 index where are the largest top 
buying and selling 100 companies of Pakistan, the fiscal year 2010 to 2014. We discuss all trading 
firms in KSE 100 except the firms belonging to financial firms, real estate, and trust sectors because 
of their different financial structure. The main reason for using non-financial firms are only that in 
non-financial, high leverage indicates distress while it is normal in other financial firms (Fama, 
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1992). The main purpose of the study is to find out what extent effect disclosure levels of the firm 
are incorporated in stock price.  
The main variable of interest is SD-SCORE which divide in differ grading of voluntary 
disclosure as described in Appendix.1 which is provided (Jiang and Habib, 2009). To calculate other 
variables, financial data of firms is used such as total assets, profit, total liabilities, the book value of 
equality which is collected from the annual reports. Total 62 companies are including in study 
because, in KSE 100, we eliminate financial sectors and some other firms due to an insufficient 
amount of data. 
We estimate the firm-specific return to measure the synchronicity using the linear regression. 
Which is firstly developed by (Morck et al., 2000).We calculate the R-square of each firm for each 
calendar year through the regression of normally daily return (RTRNi,t) on market-wide return 
(MKTi,t). Here we don’t use the industry index because in Pakistan industry does not as much matter 
as a market index. overall for each financial year of one firm, we calculate the R-squared using the 
following regression model: 
RTRNi,t = ɑ + β1MKTi,t  + β2MKTi,t-1   + εit , (1) 
Market return for a specific day t is measured by the product of each firm market return and 
weighted percentage value. Therefore the MKTi is the value-weighted of these firms daily return. 
MKTi, t-1 is lag return matrix which the presence of the information effect on the price of the share. 
We use the market index which is same for all the companies.  
Following (Piotrowski and Roulstone, 2004). We take log transform R-square from first 
regression. This study uses R2 measure to determine synchronicity. The reason for ignoring classical 
measure is that it only captures country or market level synchronicity while fail to capture firm level 
synchronicity (Matthew, 2015). 
SYNCH=log(R SQUATED/(1-R SQUARED)I,t, (2) 
The model includes other six common control variables, these are 1. The market value of 
equity MVE, 2.  SIZE, 3. Leverage LEV, 4. Market to book ratio MB, These variables are used in 
different papers by Piotroski & Roulstone, 2004: Gul et al, 2010 ) 
SYNCHi,t=  ɑ0 + β1SDSOREi,t   +  β2 log(MVEi,t)  + β3SIZEi,t + β4LEVi,t + β5MBi,t +εi,t, , (3) 
Here the first control variable is the market value of equity is a proxy of log(MVE). It's 
measured by logarithm market value of the firm. This variable shows the market capitalization of a 
firm that points out the cost for an investor to buy the firm outright. The second control variable is 
the size of the firm. The proxy of SIZE is to take the log of total assets of a firm. Different studies 
conclude that size of the firm effect to explain the stock returns (Kim, 2003). The third control 
variable is leverage risk, which proxy of LEV is total liabilities divided by total assets. It helps the 
firms to find risk factors and can improve the firm profit. The fourth controlling variable is a market 
to book value ratio. The proxy of MB is using total firms market value to divided the book value of 
its equity. It helps the firm to make a quick comparison of other compotators of compare their share 
price is it undervalued or overvalued.  
In this paper, all that four control variables are associated with firm stock price return. These 
control variables are an important part of the stock price synchronicity measurement and it also the 
component to our main interest variable SD-SCORE. 
 
Empirical results 
This table 1 reports descriptive statistics for all variables. Our main variables are 
synchronicity and D-SCORE. It is a yearly based observation of synchronicity. There is a dependent 
variable from synchronicity SYNC. The total number of observation is 310. The main interest of 
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variable in this study is D-Score, the mean is 33.29, it shows that the voluntary disclosure is not as 
higher in our country firms. The mean of leverage is 0.526716 which shows the presence of high 
leveraged firm in our sample. The size of firms which are used is almost same in size. The mean of 
size is 7.256.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
 SYNC SD-
SCORE 
LEV MB MVE SIZE 
 Mean 1.07121 33.29032 0.526716 38.40498 10.09676 7.256108 
 Median 0.88168 35 0.490041 1.135414 10.11039 7.346025 
 Maximum 0.31507 45 7.738727 2812.430 12.05067 8.889862 
 Minimum -5.2680 11 0.013933 -110.621 7.789584 4.491502 
 Std. Dev. 0.86934 6.514577 0.508873 290.5259 0.691467 0.66881 
Observations 310 310 310 310 310 310 
Note: The table reports descriptive statistics of the entire variables, either dependent or independents 
 
Table 2 reports the correlation of all the variables. It shows the positive relationship between 
the synchronicity and voluntary disclosure. There is no high correlation of independent variables so 
there is no problem of high correlate.  
 
Table 2: Correlation Analysis 
 SD-
SCORE 
LEV MB MVE SIZE SYNC 
SD-SCORE 1      
LEV -0.06123 1     
MB 0.101694 -0.09067 1    
MVE 0.410734 -0.03823 0.134469 1   
SIZE 0.150483 0.006972 -0.51409 0.525339 1  
SYNC 0.26405 0.025758 0.055082 0.414463 0.412636 1 
Note: This table states the correlation of all the variable, and SYNC is the dependent variable 
 
Table 3 reports the synchronicity regression results of this paper. According to result, there is 
a significant and positive relation between the stock price synchronicity and voluntary disclosure. 
The coefficient of SD-SCORE is 1.87 and it is significant which shows a strong positive relationship 
between firm’s disclosure level and how disclosure level effects the price synchronicity.  The other 
control variable like SIZE has also highly significant relation with synchronicity, it shows the large 
size firm has higher synchronicity risk. LEV and MVE do not affect synchronicity as shown by an 
insignificant relationship with synchronicity.  
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Table 3: Regression Analysis 
                                                           SYNH 
Variables  Coefficient t-statics P-value 
Intercept  -7.283266 -11.39388 0.0000 
SD-SCORE 1.875303*** 2.641706 0.0087
LEV 0.103702 1.249486 0.2124 
MB .000948*** 4.667320 0.0000
MVE 0.044164 0.484387 0.6285 
SIZE 0.696078*** 6.779410 0.0000
*** significant at .01 level 
** significant at .05 level 
*significant at .10 level 
Note: This table reports the relation between synchronicity and other independent variables. The 
synchronicity is calculated using equation SYNCH=log (R SQUATED/(1-R SQUARED), R is 
calculated by market return.  
 
The results of this paper are consistent with previous research. (Xing & Anderson, 2011) 
argued on the positive relation of synchronicity with firm-specific information. According to their 
research, stock price synchronicity not only incorporates the public information but it also 
incorporates the private information also. He described the inverse U-shaped relation between 
synchronicity and firm-specific information.  
Empirical evidence also highlights the degree of disclosure. It distinguishes between the 
quality of public and private information impound in the stock price. In different conditions of stock 
price synchronicity are high or low, are based on the information environment of more or less public 
information of firm (Kelly, 2005).  
 
Conclusion 
This study is conducted to examine the relationship between stock price synchronicity and 
voluntary disclosure in Pakistan stock exchange from 2010 to 2014, to measure voluntary score, SD-
SCORE is used. The synchronicity is measured by R-squared. The results of this study are based on 
multi-variant analysis, there is a significant positive relation between stock price synchronicity and 
firm’s voluntary disclosure levels. (Xing & Anderson, 2011) research paper supports our results 
also. The amount of voluntary disclosure or firm-specific information also incorporates in the share 
price of the firm’s stock, but it is not proportionate always in stock because firms stock price reflects 
both information either public or private and voluntary disclosure is only the public information. 
(Xing & Anderson, 2011) describe this relation as an inversely u-shaped between stock price 
synchronicity and firm-specific information.  
The result of our study is to highlight the difference between public and private information 
incorporate in stock price. Stock price synchronicity can be either high or low due to the different 
informational environment of more or less firm specific information. The ambiguity in our results 
also clears by (Kelly 2005, Dasgupta, 2010). They show in their papers that quality of information is 
positively related with stock price synchronicity.  
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 Appendix 1 
Main Element of SD-SCORE 
1. Background information: 
Statement of objectives or corporation goals; 
Organizational structure is described  
Statement of corporate strategy given; 
Principal market; 
Principal product; 
Competitive environment; 
And what strategies are used to achieved their goals during the year 
Note: to give one point to all and plus one additional point when quantitative data. 
2. Five years of historical results summary: 
Information about return on asset or return on assets (tax rate, interest expense, net income and total 
asset)  
Information about net profit margin or net profit margin (tax rate, net income, sales and interest 
expense) 
Information about Assets turnover or assets turnover (sales and total assets) 
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Information about return on equity or return on equity (net income and stocks holder equity) 
Summary of sales and net income for most recent eight quarters and comparison of financial 
performance with the prospectus. 
Note: for each item, one point score and 2 scores are for more the ten years’ information. 
3. Key non-financial elements: 
Numbers of employees; 
Units sold 
Market share 
Unit selling price 
Production volume 
Percentage of sales in production in last five years 
Customer satisfaction 
Growth in units sold 
Regulation compliance 
Note: for each item two-point score. 
4. Project information: 
Cash flow forecast; 
Research and development expenditure forecast 
Profit forecast 
Cash flow forecast 
Share price estimation; and  
Share price forecast 
Note: for each prediction 2 points score and for point estimate three points score 
5. Management discussion and analysis: 
Change in inventory; 
Change in income; 
Change in revenue; 
Change in cost of goods sold; 
Change in operating income; 
Change in selling and administrative expense before income tax, depreciation, and amortization  
Change in net income 
Change in inventory 
Change in net accounts receivable  
Change in market share 
Change in capital expenditure 
Change in interest expense or interest income 
Note: for detailed of each item one point score and one for additional point if explanation with 
quantitative data 
 
 
